This need not, nevertheless, wholly supersede a narrower sense of ‘structure’, which identifies these relatively ‘high’ authorized norms that can be modified solely by way of a specifically onerous course of reminiscent of a large parliamentary majority or a preferred referendum.
P12 of reprint in Twining (ed.), Authorized Theory and Widespread Law; penultimate paragraph of Section II. It’s powerful to make sense of that view, perhaps as a result of there’s none to be product of it. Simpson appears to grasp (based on comments earlier in the same paragraph) that Hart’s view is that there can be legal guidelines whose “standing as legislation does not essentially depend on their having been laid down”.
In such a case, the priest should argue as if he endorses the essential norm of Jewish Legislation, but after all, being a Catholic, he does probably not endorse it, it does not replicate his own views about what is true and unsuitable (Raz 1979, 153-157).
But it surely gets worse.) Simpson describes a customized as a apply “which is regularly observed and has been frequently noticed for a while in a gaggle, and which is regarded within the group as the conventional and proper practice” (92) which can remind any informed reader of Hart’s account of a social rule, although perhaps much less developed.