Importantly, Kelsen allows for the legislative process to acknowledge the regulation as the product of political and moral debate which is the product of the activity of the legislature earlier than it becomes part of the domain of the static theory of regulation.
The Pure Idea of Regulation can accommodate this by accepting that what issues most is just not whether or not explicit legal norms are coercive however whether, by containing coercive norms, the legal order as a complete is coercive—which Hart doesn’t deny.
Descriptively, the Pure Theory of Law has always been about power. The focus of the sequence is on the event of unique pondering in legal concept, with subjects ranging from regulation and language, logic and authorized reasoning, morality and the law, vital authorized studies, and transnational legislation.
As Joseph Raz observed, Kelsen agrees with the Natural Law tradition on this explicit respect; both assume that the normativity of law can only be explained as one would explain the normativity of morality, or faith for that matter, particularly, when it comes to valid reasons for motion (Raz 1979, 134-137; but cf. Paulson 2012).
As Brian Leiter (1998) factors out, philosophy of regulation is one of the few philosophical disciplines that takes conceptual analysis as its principal concern; most different areas in philosophy have taken a naturalistic turn, incorporating the instruments and methods of the sciences.